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Board Meeting Attendance by Outside Directors
1
 
Byung Min and Amon Chizema 
 
Outside directors’ regular board meeting attendance is important in improving the effectiveness of a 
governance system. Such attendance is evidence of their commitment to the firm as key other players 
in monitoring and decision-making. Using a unique dataset for Korea firms, and three-level random 
coefficients models, we find that, foreign outside directors, an independent appointment process, 
professional knowledge of business operations, and accumulated firm-specific knowledge are 
important factors that affect outside directors’ attendance of board meetings. The results also confirm 
that both outside directors’ personal characteristics and the social context are crucial in 
understanding their board meeting attendance. Further analysis shows that a positive corporate 
environment that supports the outside director system encourages outside directors’ attendance at 
board meetings.  
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INTRODUCTION 
A growing stream of corporate governance literature treats the frequency of board meetings 
as a measure of outside directors’ involvement (Brick and Chidambaran, 2010; Ntim and 
Osei, 2011) and commitment to monitor top management (Adams, 2005; Cai, Garner and 
Walkling, 2009). As such the number of meetings has been used as a proxy for active boards 
(Carter, Simkins and Simpson, 2003; Xie, Davidson and DaDalt, 2003), board diligence 
(Carcello, Hermanson and Neal, 2002) and considered, too, as an important factor in 
improving board effectiveness (Conger, Finegold and Lawler III, 1998). The number of board 
meetings has also been found to be inversely related to firm value (Vafeas, 1999), suggesting 
that firms react to poor performance by increasing the frequency of board meetings.   
 Generally, meetings are planned gatherings of three or more people who assemble for 
a purpose that is ostensibly related to some aspect of organizational or group function 
(Boden, 1995; Schwartzman, 1989). In the context of the corporation, board meetings are the 
primary mechanism for outside directors to keep informed of a ﬁrm’s operations (Masulis, 
Wang and Xie, 2012), business conditions and managerial decision making (Adams and 
Ferreira, 2008), so that they can effectively participate in a ﬁrm’s governance (Lipton and 
Lorsch, 1992). Consequently, institutional investors and governance activists have used board 
meeting attendance records to evaluate director performance, and directors who frequently 
miss board meetings are often criticized as being ineffective monitors and receive 
signiﬁcantly fewer votes for their re-election (Cai et al., 2009). 
Board meetings have also been a subject of interest in strategy research. For example, 
early empirical studies of strategy development such as that by Mintzberg (1973) 
demonstrated that managers spend more than 70 per cent of their time in discussion in 
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different forms of meetings. More recently, scholars have studied meetings as a central arena 
for decision-making and strategizing by focusing on social processes within them and how 
they affect attention given to strategic issues (Jarzabkowski and Seidl, 2008). Attempts have 
also been made to understand how board directors and managers skilfully and dynamically 
interact with one another, through conversation, using goal-directed practices to achieve 
particular outcomes (Kwon, Clarke and Wodak, 2014).  
Thus, we know about the importance of board meetings and the frequency at which they take 
place in firms and, to some extent, about the effects of meetings upon the organizations in 
which they take place (Jarzabkowski and Seidl, 2008).  For example, Liu, Wang and Wu 
(2014) studied the effect of independent directors' attendance at board meetings on the 
tunneling behavior of large shareholders and found that a higher rate of independent director 
attendance protects investors by alleviating tunneling.  
What we know less about is the behaviour of the actors [outside directors] concerning 
attendance at board meetings. This alludes to the lack of understanding of the factors that 
promote or undermine outside directors’ attendance of board meetings. What motivates 
outside directors to attend board meetings? Does it take certain firm conditions and/or 
director characteristics to attend board meetings? In the context of Korea, our paper directly 
addresses this gap in understanding by drawing on insights from organizational commitment 
literature and theory (Mowday, Porter and Steers, 1982).  
The choice of examining board meeting attendance by outside directors through the 
lens of organizational commitment, and of using Korea as a research laboratory, is justifiable. 
First, we argue that by accepting appointment, the outside director chooses to identify with 
and commits to help the firm achieve its strategic goals (Guth and MacMillan, 1986) by being 
present in the meetings where discussions and decisions about the firm take place. Attending 
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meetings by outside directors, like turning up for work by employees, is manifestation of 
organizational commitment (Mathieu and Zajac, 1990).  Second, Korea experienced dramatic 
changes in her corporate governance system, following the Asian financial crisis of 1997. 
Prior to the corporate governance reforms, controlling shareholders expropriated firm 
resources even when their ownership concentration was small (Chizema and Kim, 2010). 
Firms with a high disparity between control rights and ownership rights showed low 
profitability. When a business group transferred resources from a subsidiary to another, they 
were often wasted, suggesting that tunneling occurred. One of the mechanisms that were 
adopted to mitigate these governance problems is the use of outside directors. Yet we now 
know that attendance of meetings by outside directors reduces the likelihood of tunnelling, 
(Liu et al., 2014). Thus, understanding the determinants of this practice in a context like 
Korea (with a previous history of tunneling) is necessary.    
Our study makes a number of contributions to the theory and literature of corporate 
governance. First, we view attendance of board meetings by outside directors as commitment 
to the goals and values of the firm. In the face of extensive criticism of the board and 
questions about the effectiveness of outside directors in controlling the CEO, this study opens 
a new avenue of examining outside directors through the lens of organizational commitment. 
Second, in the context of Korea, Chizema and Kim (2010) examined the determinants of 
appointing outside directors. From their study, we know that a number of factors (foreign 
ownership, business group affiliation, weak financial performance) are associated with the 
appointment of outside directors. Chang, Oh, Park and Jang (2015) reported the importance 
of characteristics of board members on corporate social responsibility without addressing the 
reasons why board members attend board meeting. Min and Verhoeven (2013) reported a 
positive effect of outside director on firm value using characteristics of outside directors as 
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instrument for the estimation. Apart from that we do not know what these outside directors in 
Korea actually do to help their firms. As a first step, they have to be where firm decisions are 
taken i.e. the boardroom. Our study builds on these previous ones by considering the 
behaviour of the directors at attending meetings, an initial step towards the board process. 
Our estimations show that both outside directors’ personal characteristics and the 
social context are crucial in understanding outside directors’ board meeting attendance. 
Foreign outside directors, an independent appointment process, professional knowledge about 
business operations and accumulated firm-specific knowledge are identified as significant. 
By contrast, general experience – indicated by age and level of education – is not significant.  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Organizational Commitment 
Organizational commitment may be defined as the relative strength of an individual’s 
identification with and involvement in a particular organization (Mowday, Porter and Steers, 
1982). It can be identified by at least three factors: (1) a strong belief in and acceptance of the 
organization’s goals and values; (2) a willingness to exert considerable effort on behalf of the 
organization; and (3) a strong desire to maintain membership in the organization (Porter, 
Steers, Mowday and Boulian, 1974). Organizational commitment, therefore, derives from a 
desire to see the organization succeed in its goals and a feeling of pride at being part of the 
organization (Cohen, 2003), manifest in the individual’s pledging or binding to certain 
behavioural acts (Salancik, 1977).  
Further antecedents to commitment include the nature and quality of an employees’ 
work and organizational experiences (Buchanan, 1974; Meyer et al., 2002). Moreover, 
commitment has been shown to be related to social involvement with colleagues (Sheldon, 
1971), personal investments as length of organizational service, age (Hrebiniak, 1974), 
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opportunities for achievement (Lee, 1971) and education (Koch and Steers, 1976). Of interest 
to this study, too, is that top management commitment has been seen as essential to the 
survival and health of complex organizations (Perrow, 1986; Selznick, 1957). 
Previous research has also explored the consequences of organizational commitment 
(Steers, 1977). For example, highly committed employees should have a strong desire and 
intent to remain with the organization, an outcome implicit in the definition of commitment. 
Such behavioural intentions should be manifested in subsequent employee retention or 
turnover (Porter, et al., 1974) and absenteeism or attendance (Mathieu and Zajac, 1990; 
Meyer et al., 2002). Of course, commitment has also been seen to be related to performance 
under the assumption that committed employees would expend greater effort on the job. 
Although these studies relate predominantly to the behaviour of employees, a lot can 
be drawn from them in order to improve our understanding of board meeting attendance by 
outside directors. We argue that outside directors are quasi-employees of the organization, 
rewarded for their services through director fees (Yermack, 2004) and punishable for their 
actions through non-re-election (Cai et al., 2009) and loss of reputation (Fich and Shivdasani, 
2006). Indeed, corporate governance literature treats outside directors as individuals recruited 
to carry out two principal functions: monitoring and advising the board (Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 2006; Adams and Ferreira, 2008). We argue further that, consistent with previous 
studies, we view board meeting attendance as a measure of board involvement in the firm 
(Brick and Chidambaran, 2010; Vafeas, 1999) and as manifestation or an outcome of 
commitment (Meyer et al., 2002) by outside directors. Thus, in line with the three factors of 
commitment (Porter, et al., 1974), we posit that, first, attendance of meetings by outside 
directors signals a strong belief in and acceptance of the firm’s goals and values. Second, in 
the case of outside directors, one can only exert considerable effort on behalf of the 
organization by attending the meeting in the first place. Specifically, directors can contribute 
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to organizational goals only when they are present at work i.e. attend board meetings. Indeed, 
contributing to decision making is certainly an important director role, but concerns about 
contributions presuppose that directors are present at the board meetings. Third, for outside 
directors, a strong desire to maintain membership in the organization is demonstrated by 
socialising with other organizational actors in various forums including especially board 
meetings.  
However, personal director circumstances or/and the organizational environment may 
hinder or encourage commitment by the outside director, consequently determining the level 
of board meeting attendance. Thus drawing on organizational commitment arguments we 
examine the determinants of board meeting attendance in a unique institutional context i.e. 
Korea. In the sections below, we develop our hypotheses.   
Foreign Outside Directors  
Earlier studies on Korean boards document an increasing trend of foreign outside directors 
(Chizema and Kim, 2010; Choi, Park and Yoo, 2007; Min, 2013; Min and Smyth, 2014). 
This is a natural outcome of the policy reforms in Korea focusing on the introduction of 
outside director system as one of main reforms, which is similar to other emerging markets 
(Reed, 2002). A firm may favour the appointment of foreign outside directors for some 
reasons. For example, foreign outside directors may be a more effective way of ensuring 
board independence. They may have special skills that, for example, allow them better access 
to the global capital market than local board members. Foreign outside directors may also 
have experience with the outside director systems in their home countries. Alternatively, a 
firm may favour the appointment of foreign directors mainly for promotional purposes, 
because it makes the board structure “look” better. However, we argue that most of these 
benefits would accrue to the firm where outside directors attend meetings to engage with 
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other local directors in the business of monitoring and providing advice. But, such attendance 
is not guaranteed. 
We suggest a number of reasons why foreign outside directors’ may not attend board 
meetings. First, a director’s geographic distance from corporate headquarters may prohibit 
on-site visits and attending board meetings (usually held at corporate headquarters) as this 
may become more difficult and time-consuming. Of course, from the commitment 
perspective, this undermines a director’s ability and incentives to gather information and 
closely monitor management. Consistent with this view, Lerner (1995) finds that venture 
capitalists are reluctant to sit on boards of geographically distant firms, and Knyazeva, 
Knyazeva and Masulis (2011) document a signiﬁcant local component to the matching 
process of companies and outside director candidates. The obstacles created by distance are 
even greater for foreign directors, as the time zone differences and time and energy consumed 
by international travel, coupled with heightened security concerns post 9/11 (Masulis et al., 
2012), are likely to impose heavier burdens on foreign directors than on domestic directors, 
further eroding their commitment to attend meetings. 
Second, cultural differences can be one barrier (Hofstede 1997). For example, in the 
Asian culture people tend to devote more time, than Westerners, greeting each other before 
discussing the main issues of the meeting. This may reflect different views on the value of 
time and on establishing relationships (Ebrey, Walthall and Palais, 2009).  
Third, a foreign outside director may also face disadvantages in communicating in the 
local language, potentially getting discouraged from attending meetings. Communication in 
English is a challenging task in Korea. Most non-Korean outside directors rely on English to 
communicate at board meetings, without an English interpreter. Almost all documents for 
board meetings are in Korean, and normally board members are expected to read relevant 
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materials before attending meetings, and to study the issues to be discussed during the 
meeting. Moreover, as board members, outside directors need to be able to listen to and 
debate other people’s viewpoints.  Because of these oral and written communication 
difficulties (Gilsdorf, 1986; Ebrey, Walthall and Palais, 2009), we expect non-Korean 
directors to have less motivation to attend board meetings. Furthermore, foreign outside 
directors may have difficulties because of their absent or weak informal social networks and 
different understandings of the meeting process due partly to cultural differences. Therefore, 
we hypothesize: 
H1. Foreign outside directors will attend board meetings less frequently than local outside 
directors.  
Outside Directors Appointed through an Independent Screening Process 
Independent and affiliate directors are both subsets of outside directors. The former refers to 
a group of directors that has no past dealings with the firm, while the latter could be former 
employees or executive directors of the focal firm (Rediker and Seth, 1995). They could be 
even friends or relations of the CEO. Studies show that independent directors are better for 
company boards (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Min and Verhoeven, 2013; Choi et al., 2007; 
Black, Jang and Kim, 2006). Consequently, some companies appoint a good proportion of 
independent directors. One strategy to ensure that the right people are appointed to the board 
is to apply an independent screening process through an appropriate nomination committee 
(Kim and Lee, 2015).  From several possible reasons why outside directors appointed through 
an independent screening process are likely to be more committed to the cause of the 
organization, we discuss two below. First, outside directors appointed through an independent 
screening process tend to have a stronger sense of self-regulation and desire to establish a 
good reputation because their reputation represents their marketability in the outsider market. 
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Outsiders who are concerned with their reputation will exercise less ex post opportunism 
after their appointment and/or have more motivation to advertise themselves through regular 
attendance at the board meetings (Nelson 1974; Spence 1973). Second, they are not beholden 
to the CEO for their appointment, and thus attend meetings without conflict of interest. Such 
confidence and commitment to the firm and not to the CEO should result in better meeting 
attendance.   
H2. An outside director appointed through an independent selection process will attend 
board meetings more frequently than others. 
Re-appointed Directors   
For the director, reappointment to the board is a reflection of good reputation and marks an 
extension to professional tenure (Lu and Sun, 2010). Such a director is likely to pay more 
attention to job performance as poor performance will dramatically impair his or her 
reputational capital. Relatedly, Vafeas (2003) argues that directors who survive long tenure 
must perform well if the job market of directors is efficient. Moreover, previous studies (e.g., 
Salancik, 1977; O’Reilly and Caldwell, 1981) suggest that directors’ organizational 
commitment increases in tenure. Indeed, Salancik (1977) argues that people’s actions become 
more committing if the revocability of their actions is lower. Furthermore, O’Reilly and 
Caldwell (1981) provide evidence that behavioural commitment is significantly associated 
with lower job turnover. We argue that directors’ re-appointment to the board signifies the 
trust and level of satisfaction that shareholders have in the individuals. This act is, on the part 
of the director, is reassuring and translates into role satisfaction, an aspect that should 
enhance re-appointed directors’ commitment to fulfil their duties, including the attendance of 
board meetings. This argument draws support from the social exchange approach to 
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commitment, which makes the general proposition that people feel bound to an entity to the 
extent that it is associated with positive experiences for them (Mowday et al., 1982). 
In summary, re-appointed directors have greater experience, expertise, reputation and 
reassurance, at least, with the focal firm, thus garnering confidence to meet more regularly 
with other directors to discuss the business of the firm. 
H3: Reappointed outside directors are more likely to attend board meetings more regularly 
than newly appointed ones.   
Busy Directors  
The issue of busy directors has often been seen in terms of the number of board seats that an 
individual director holds (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). Corporate governance scholars do not 
agree on the issue of busy directors i.e. directors who hold multiple board seats.  One view is 
that multiple board seats indicate the importance of the director-hugely sought after by 
several firms. By engaging with several companies, such directors have extensive access to 
knowledge and acquire useful experience that, potentially, helps all the companies in the 
network. Given this background, such directors, we argue, are confident and would commit 
to attending meetings in order to showcase their knowledge.  
  The other view suggests that busy directors, who spread their time too thin by taking 
on too many outside directorships, may not fully understand the business of all the companies 
where they hold appointments. This is consistent with the argument that CEO-directors face 
more time constraints due to the burdens of the day-to-day management of their own ﬁrms 
(Booth and Deli, 1996) and directors sitting on several boards may be overstretched in terms 
of their time and energy (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006).  Such lack of detailed knowledge about 
any of the companies and lack of time reduces their level of confidence and commitment to 
attend meetings. Indeed, scholars have shown that directors holding more board seats and 
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directors who are CEOs of other companies are signiﬁcantly more likely to miss board 
meetings (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). While previous studies have considered the extent to 
which an individual director is busy by the number of board appointments they hold, it is also 
plausible that some directors could be considered busy even without other board 
commitments. Thus, the question is not about the number of board seats that one holds, but 
rather one of time availability or constraints. For example, some professions demand more, in 
terms of time, from the professionals than others. Thus, the less time a typical director has, 
the more likely he/she will have attendance problems. 
 H4: The time constraints of outside directors will reduce their attendance rate. 
 
 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Data 
To test our hypotheses we used survey data from the Korea Corporate Governance Service as 
well as financial data from the Korea Listed Companies Association (KLCA), arguably the 
most comprehensive data set for corporations in Korea. Survey data provided information 
about the characteristics of outside directors, including their attendance at board meetings, 
age, education, profession and study major at university, as well as firm-level information 
such as payments to outside directors. The remaining firm-level information was obtained 
from the KLCA database.  
Measurement 
Dependent variable: The dependent variable is the percentage of meeting attendance by 
outside directors. 
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Independent variables: To test the hypothesis that foreign outside directors are less likely to 
attend board meetings, we include a binary variable, 1 for non-Korean directors, and 0 
otherwise. We use the variable, committee, coded as 1 if a firm appointed outside directors 
through a committee screening process and 0 otherwise. We chose the committee variable to 
investigate whether or not average attendance is influenced by how a firm appoints outside 
directors through an independent selection process. To test the hypothesis that re-appointed 
directors are more likely to attend board meetings, we use a variable that is grand-mean 
centred: reappointment. Reappointment is expected to represent an outside director’s firm-
specific experience/knowledge. To test H4 that suggests that busy directors are less likely to 
attend board meetings, we consider different types of jobs as covariates. Our view is that 
lawyers and medical doctors are usually busier than other professionals, given that their 
incomes are closely linked to the time they spend working.
2
 We, therefore, use a binary 
variable, lawyer_doctor, coded as 1 if an outside director’s job is either lawyer or medical 
doctor and 0 otherwise. Similarly we added a binary variable for journalist. 
Control variables: We control for firm size. Masulis et al., (2012) find that among ﬁrm 
characteristics, directors are less likely to miss board meetings at larger ﬁrms. We also 
control for board size. The larger the board, the more free-riding behaviour may occur, since 
it may be less important that a particular director is not present at the meeting. We control for 
director’s age, expected to capture the level of general experience of outside directors. There 
is evidence that meeting fees are effective at influencing directors’ attendance behaviour 
(Adams and Ferreira, 2008). We, therefore, control for the fees made to directors for 
attending meetings. 
                                                          
2
 Information about the number of board positions held in other firms is not available. 
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Econometric Model 
The multilevel random coefficients model for investigating the response variable Y is: 
)()( LL
uZXβY          (1), 
where X  and β denote the matrix of all covariates in the fixed parts and the corresponding 
parameters respectively. The second part of equation (1) refers to the random residual errors, 
u, at (all) different levels (L). The matrix of covariates in the random parts, Z, may or may 
not include X.  
The fixed part of the model, Xβ , is directly required to investigate the empirical 
hypotheses. The random part of the model (1),  )()( LL uZ , provides detailed information on the 
variance of the response variable. If Z=I and L=1, the random residual u will collapse to the 
errors at the lowest level (usually denoted by e), assumed to have a normal distribution with a 
mean of zero and a common variance of 2ε  at all the higher levels.  Otherwise, the second 
part of the equation denotes the residual error terms at the higher level, depending on the 
dimension of L, assumed to be independent from e and to have a multivariate normal 
distribution with a mean of zero.  
We use multilevel random coefficients models to examine our empirical hypotheses 
for three reasons. First, outside directors’ participation in board meetings is the result of their 
behavioural decisions. Conceptually, an individual’s decisions are influenced by the 
organisation he/she belongs to.  Hunter and van den Eeden (1993) contend that the effects of 
social context on individuals, if any, should be mediated by intervening processes that depend 
on the characteristics of the social context. In contrast to traditional models, the multilevel 
model allows us to examine cross-level interactions. Second, our dataset has nested 
multilevel characteristics. The repeatedly observed occasions are nested in the personal level 
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(i.e., outside directors), which is in turn nested in the firm. Third, the greatest advantage of 
the multilevel random coefficients models is that it can model random residuals at all levels 
of analysis simultaneously. Thus, economic relationships between variables can be examined 
at both within- and between-subject levels (in addition to interactions between the cross 
levels). The conceptualising error term allows us to compare error variance.
3
  
RESULTS  
Descriptive Results 
The last column of Table 1 shows that the board meeting attendance rate by outside directors 
varies widely. It ranged from zero to 100 percent. The second column of the table also 
indicates that the proportion of always-attending groups (36.93%) is disproportionately high. 
In contrast, 5.66 percent of respondents answered they never attended the required board 
meetings.  The median value of the attendance rate is 86 percent.
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Table 1 about here 
Table 2 shows that there is no pattern in the waves of average attendance rates 
between 2002 and 2006. Mean values vary between a low of 68.69 percent in 2003 and a 
high of 72.14 percent in 2005, with similar standard deviations. The table also indicates that 
not only the mean values but also other statistics, including low and high percentiles and 
median values of the attendance rates, are consistently lower in 2003 than in other years.  
                                                          
3
 The fundamental shortcoming of traditional OLS and weighted LS is that they do not model error properly, 
which can result in misleading parameter estimations. 
4
 The mean attendance rate in Korea is 71 percent. In contrast to the case of Korea, the SEC in the US stipulates 
that board members must meet the 75 percent participation threshold level.  
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Table 2 about here 
 
 
Table 3 reports the types of jobs held by outside directors, showing that executive 
managers (of other firms) and professors are the most common. The figures in the second 
column show that the proportion of outside directors accounted for by these two jobs 
combined is 55 percent.   
Table 3 about here 
 
Table 4 indicates that the most popular study major of appointed outside directors is 
business, accounting for 44 percent of the total observations, followed by law (21 percent). 
The proportion of outside directors’ study majors that are directly related to business 
operations and the firm’s strategic decisions is 65 percent.  
Table 4 about here 
 
In summary, our dataset indicates that attendance rates by outside directors during 2002-2006 
have a skewed distribution, and that appointed outside directors have variety of social-
economic positions. Based on this observation, we devised the following estimation strategy. 
First, we use natural logarithm of the attendance rate as a response variable to reduce the 
skewness problem. Second, we use the nonlinear estimation method after recoding the 
attendance rate into a binary variable. 
Estimation Results 
The estimation results in Table 5 are based on three-level random coefficients models, where 
the repeatedly observed attendance rate by outside directors is nested in the personal (i.e., 
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outside director) level, which in turn is nested in the firm level. Attendance rates by outside 
directors are the response variable.  
Model 1 in Table 5 refers to the intercept-only model without covariates, which is 
mainly to investigate the variance of the response variable. The random part of the output 
reports that total variance of attendance provides a baseline for the estimation of explained 
and unexplained variance. The sum of these intra-class correlations is 81 percent, suggesting 
that total variance of the attendance rate is largely explained by variations at the firm and 
individual levels, with almost equal weights.
5
 
The estimation results from Model 2 strongly support Hypothesis 1. The sign of the 
estimated coefficient of the non-Korean variable is negative and significant at the 1 percent 
level. It indicates that the expected attendance rate of a foreign outside director is around 84 
percent less than that of a Korean outside director. With )3(2 = 252 for the comparison of 
the change in deviance from Model 1, Model 2 is considered as having a better fit of between 
the two models. Compared to Model 1, the inclusion of the individual level variable reduces 
the individual level variance in the random part by about 20 percent (i.e., from 1.238 to 
0.998).
6
 
The estimation results of Model 3 in Table 5 support our research hypothesis H2 at 
the 1 percent significance level. The estimated coefficient suggests that the average 
                                                          
5
 The variance at the individual level (i.e., outside director) is 1.238 with a standard error of 0.064, and variance 
at the firm level is 1.171 with a standard error of 0.113. The variance of unexplained residuals is 0.562. The 
intra-class correlation at the firm level, calculated by 1.171/(1.171+1.238+0.562), shows that 39.4 percent of the 
variance of the attendance rate is at the firm level. The calculation of intra-class correlation at the personal level 
is 41.7 percent. 
6
 The inclusion of the individual level increased the group-level variance (i.e., the lowest row of random part) by 
around 5 percent, which is similar to Hox (2000). 
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attendance rate for firms that appoint outside directors through a committee is 35 percent 
higher than that of other firms.   Outside directors appointed by committees are assumed to be 
more independent than those appointed by personal recommendation, including incumbent 
CEOs and controlling shareholders. Independent outside directors seem to have greater 
motivation to participate in a firm’s strategic decisions as well as the commitment to monitor 
both management and controlling shareholders.  
 
Table 5 about here 
 
 
 
An examination of a cross-level interaction variable is useful in examining the 
intervening process of the effects of social context on individuals (Hunter and Eeden 1993).
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In our estimation model, both random intercept and slope at level one are assumed to be a 
function of an outsider’s characteristics (i.e., non-Korean), which in turn are a function of the 
firm’s characteristics (i.e., committee).8 
The estimated coefficient of the cross-level interaction variable is significant at the 
conventional level. The sign of this coefficient is positive, implying that an independent 
selection process helps foreign outside director to attend board meetings to a greater extent 
than Korean outside directors. In other words, an independent selection process for outside 
directors has an effect on the attendance rates of outside directors.  
                                                          
7 The possibility of the heterogeneous effect of a higher level variable on a lower level variable has been 
acknowledged in the educational research literature. Cronbach and Webb (1975) conjectured that effective 
teachers were only effective with certain types of students, and not necessarily effective with all students to the 
same extent. Raudenbush and Bryk (1986) also proposed different effects of public schools on pupils’ maths 
scores.  
8 We did not impose any restrictions on the structure of covariance between random intercept and slope at the 
individual level.  
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Graph 1 shows clearly this effect of an independent selection process on attendance. 
The upper solid line shows the average attendance rate of foreign outside directors (i.e., non-
Korean=0) in a firm that appointed these outside directors without an independent 
appointment process (i.e., committee=0) in comparison to the average attendance rate of 
Korean outside directors in a firm that appointed these outside directors through an 
independent appointment process (i.e., committee=1).  The positive effects of a change in the 
appointment process for outside directors, from lack of independence (i.e., committee=0) to 
an independent process (i.e., committee=1), on log attendance rate of foreign outside directors   
is 0.279 (=3.963-3.684). This positive effect of an independent appointment process on log 
attendance of Korean outside directors (i.e., non-Korean=1) is 1.393 (=2.798-1.405).  
 
Graph 1 about here 
 
The difference between 1.384 and 0.279 represents the egalitarian effect of 
independent appointment on log attendance rate. In an untabulated table, the correlation 
between the non-Korean (committee) variable and the interaction variable is 0.59 (0.21), and 
all these are significant at the 1 percent level. The correlation between non-Korean and 
committee is 0.16 and is also significant at the 1 percent level. Both of these correlations 
imply that the interaction variable, non-KoreanXcommittee, is meaningful.
9
 This finding 
suggests that a better corporate environment for the outside director system, measured by an 
independent appointment process, encourages outside directors’ board meeting attendance in 
a more egalitarian way.   
                                                          
9 The estimated regression coefficient of the non-Korean variable on the committee variable is also significant at 
the 1 percent level.  
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The results in Model 5 indicate that only firm-specific experience is important in 
facilitating outside directors’ attendance at board meetings.  On, average, reappointed outside 
directors attend board meetings more than newly appointed outside directors by around 15 
percent. This finding is consistent with research hypothesis 3. In this estimation, we used the 
reappointment variable at the beginning of each year to mitigate the problem caused by 
potential reverse causality.  
In Model 6, we added four additional variables to Model 5 with a view to investigating 
empirical hypotheses H4 (time availability). The estimated coefficients of these variables in 
Model 6 show negative signs as expected and are significant at the conventional level. 
Alternatively, we used manager for the proxy of time availability and found a positive sign 
with significance at 10 percent level (not reported). 
We also included level of education, on the assumption that highly educated people 
tend to be busier than less educated ones. However, the estimated coefficient of education is 
not significant. Another possible interpretation of this result is that more educated people 
believe their market value in the outside director market is higher than that of less educated 
ones, particularly in an economy (i.e., Korea) where education is highly valued. Therefore, 
more educated people have less motivation to ‘sell’ themselves (Nelson 1974). 
The estimated coefficients of accountdegree, businessdegree and lawdegree show 
positive signs and are significant at the 1 percent level. All of these three covariates are 
binary variables that indicate outside directors’ study majors at university. All of these 
degrees are directly associated with business operations and a firm’s strategic decisions. In an 
untabulated table, we added a binary variable for outside directors who studied social science 
and a binary variable for those who studied pharmacy. Neither of these two variables was 
significant, supporting the proposition that professional knowledge about corporate strategic 
decisions is important in encouraging outside directors to attend board meetings.  
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DISCUSSION ABOUT THE MAIN FINDINGS 
We consider Model 6 in Table 5 to be the preferred full model. All estimated coefficients 
associated with our research hypotheses in this model show the expected signs and are 
significant at least at the conventional level. The statistics of )6(2  for the change in 
deviance from Model 5 to Model 6 are also significant at the conventional level.  
To examine the relative magnitudes of each covariate on the response variable, we 
standardised the estimated coefficients of Model 6 by multiplying the standard deviation of 
each covariate with the corresponding estimated coefficients.
10
 The figures in the last column 
in Table 5 are in percentage form. The results suggest that foreign outside director, the 
independent selection of the outside directors and their interaction are overall the most 
important factors in influencing attendance rates. The cross-level interaction between non-
Korean and committee is significant, and this suggests that the mediating effects of both 
personal and firm characteristics should be taken into consideration in analysing outside 
directors’ board meeting attendance.  
Second, outside directors’ personal knowledge (regardless of generic professional 
knowledge about business operations or firm-specific knowledge) seemed to be the second 
most important factor. Financial literacy and legal knowledge are crucial requirements to 
enable outside directors to monitor managerial misbehaviour as well as to provide advice to 
management. Our estimation results also indicate that firm-specific knowledge from past 
experience is important.  
                                                          
10
 In fact, we need to divide these numbers by the standard deviation of the response variable to recover the 
standardised coefficients. Dropping this common denominator does not affect the relative magnitudes.  
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Interestingly, the results in Table 5 show that outside directors who are lawyers 
reduce the attendance rate whereas outside directors who studied law at university increase 
the attendance rate. Studying law at university does not necessarily guarantee a job as a 
lawyer in Korea. Law students need to pass an extremely competitive national examination to 
qualify as a lawyer. Lawyers usually work for a law firm, where a performance-based reward 
system (i.e., partnership structure) is common. Therefore, the opportunity cost of attending 
board meetings as an outside director is expected to be significantly higher for lawyers than 
for others. By contrast, people who studied law but did not pass the national qualification 
examinations tend to work in private or public organisations. The positive and significant 
coefficient of lawdegree indicates that professional legal knowledge is important in 
determining board meeting attendance.  
Third, financial incentive and time availability are almost equally important but have 
the opposite effects. This relatively low importance of financial incentive, compared to 
foreign outside director and personal professional knowledge, is due partly to the poorly 
designed financial incentive system for outside directors. Firms pay an equal amount to all 
outside directors irrespective of their attendance at board meetings, level of educations, 
experience or profession.
11
 In addition, the absolute amount of payment is small. The average 
annual payment to outside directors is around 23,000 US dollars, which is similar to the wage 
of a university graduate without work experience.  
Fourth, the results also imply that the overall experience of outside directors, 
measured by age, and level of education are not significant. 
         
                                                          
11
 This unilateral and predetermined payment, however, mitigates the endogeneity problem caused by reverse 
causality.  
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Further Tests - The Effect of the Corporate Environment Associated with Outside 
Directors 
To investigate further the effects of the corporate environment on outside directors’ 
attendance rates, we selected three additional variables: exceedingrate, boardownership, and 
free cash flows (FCF).  Exceedingrate, measured by a proportion of (outsiders/board 
members) that exceeds the level that is legally required, represents a firm’s voluntary 
appointment of outside directors. The amended Securities and Exchange Law stipulates that a 
large firm (i.e., with assets of no less than 2 trillion won) should appoint outside directors to 
at least 50 percent of the positions on its board. The Listing Act also requires all listed firms 
to have a ratio of at least 25 percent of outside directors to board members.  
We expect exceedingrate to capture a firm’s ‘active’ appointment of outside directors 
and thus its support for the newly introduced outside director system. Estimation outcomes in 
Table 6 (Model_c1) show that the exceedingrate is positive and significant at the 7 percent 
level, suggesting that a corporate environment that supports the outside director system 
encourages outside director to attend more board meetings. Model_c2 added an inter-class 
interaction variable, calculated by interaction between non-Korean and exceedingrate, to 
Model_c1. This interaction is significant at the 1 percent level with a positive sign, which is 
the same as the effect of the independent appointment process in Table 5.
12
 
In an untabulated table, we added a common time-trend and an interaction between 
this and exceedingrate separately to Model_c2 (Column 2). None of these additional 
variables were significant. The statistics of chi-square for the change in deviance from 
Model_c2 and model with year (the interaction variable) additionally was 0.134 (0.00). This 
                                                          
12
 All the correlations between exceedingrate, non-Korean and the interaction variable are significant at the 1 
percent level. The statistics of chi-square for the change in deviance suggest that Model_c2 is preferred although 
the direct effect of exceedingrate is no longer significant.  
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finding suggests that there is no significant role of time-trend in influencing board meeting 
attendance by outside directors. 
Models_c3-c4 and Models_c5-c6 respectively include boardownership and FCF as 
covariates to represent corporate governance. Boardownership denotes equity ownership by 
internal board members and thus is expected to have a negative sign. Jensen (1986) and 
Easterbrook (1984) suggested that free cash flow is an indication of poor governance. This 
interpretation assumes that management fails to appropriately use cash flows for profitable 
projects, given the possible choice of projects. The estimation results of Model _c3 – 
Model_c6 support the finding in Model_c1 and Model_c2.
13
   
 
Table 6 about here 
 
ROBUSTNESS CHECK  
To examine the reliability of the estimated coefficients and standard errors, we ran the three-
level random coefficients model (Model 6 in Table 5) on a yearly basis (not reported).  
We made two major findings. First, all these estimates are in line with the estimations 
found by the preferred full model. All the yearly-basis estimated coefficients have the same 
signs. Overall statistical significances, measured by the distance between the two connected 
lines in the graph, are similar for the two estimates, although some of the significances of 
age, lawyer_doctor, businessdegree and lawdegree variables dropped sharply in 2003 and to 
some extent in 2004. Second, there is no consistent pattern to whether yearly-basis estimates 
are overestimates in comparison to the pooled ones.  The graph shows that almost 40 percent 
of the yearly-basis estimates are overestimates, but lawdegree is an underestimate. The 
                                                          
13
 Although correlations between the interaction variables are not significant, all inter-class interaction variables 
are significant at the conventional level. 
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estimated coefficients of journalist and businessdegree are relatively similar between yearly-
basis and the pooled estimations.  
 
Because of some irregularity in the estimated coefficients in year 2003 or 2004, we 
reran the preferred full model (Model 6 in Table 5) excluding year 2003 or 2004 (Columns 1 
and 3 in Table 7). Columns 2 and 4 in Table 7 are modifications of these calculations by 
substituting exceedingrate and its interaction with non-Korean for committee and its 
interaction with non-Korean. Therefore, all model specifications consider a positive corporate 
attitude to the outside director system and inter-class interaction between foreign outside 
directors and this positive corporate environment.  
All estimation results are consistent with the preferred full model with the full sample 
as indicated by Model 6 in Table 5. Foreign outside director (non-Korean) and independent 
appointment process (committee) and their inter-class interaction remain significant at the 1 
percent level. The inter-class interaction is also significant at the conventional level when we 
use exceedingrate in place of committee, confirming the importance of a firm’s environment 
being favourable to the outside director system. Professional knowledge (businessdegree, 
lawdegree and accountingdegree) and firm-specific knowledge (reappointment) are also 
significant at the conventional level. However, the statistical significance of the variables for 
time availability (education, lawyer_doctor, journalnist) declined somewhat. The payment 
variable seemed to be affected the most by the exclusion of the year 2003 or 2004.  
 
Table 7 about here 
 
 
Using our preferred full model (Model 6 in Table 5), we obtained empirical Bayses 
predictions of occasions, outside directors (i.e., personal level) and firm random effects (not 
reported). These graphs imply that there are no serious violations of the normality 
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assumption, particularly for the occasion and the personal level. However, we observe that 
there are some possibilities of violations of the normality assumption at the firm level. 
Although the majority of observations are symmetric along zero, a large portion are also 
scattered at the bottom of the graph. We will examine this potential problem below.  
 
THE ISSUES OF ENDOGENEITY  
A concern is the possible endogenity associated with the correlation between the included 
covariates and unobserved firm-specific effects. Firm-specific effects such as a unique 
managerial style may lead to a preference to appoint postgraduates or aged outside directors. 
To control for this firm-specific effect, we included a series of firm-identifiers in the 
estimation model. We therefore checked the robustness of our full model (Model 6 in Table 
5) by estimating both the model without considering hierarchical structure together with firm-
identifiers (Columns 1-4 in Table 8) and the two-level random coefficients model (Columns 
5-6).   
Our estimation results are consistent with the full preferred model, although there are 
some caveats to be mentioned. The sign of the age variable sometimes became negative but 
was not significant. Education became significant at the one percent level. Exceedingrate, as 
a proxy for a favourable corporate environment towards the outside director system, seemed 
to fit better with lower-level models than with the three-level hierarchy models.  
The estimation results also illustrate the Robinson effect of aggregation data: the standard 
errors of the estimates from non-hierarchical models are generally of lower value than those 
from the multi-level models.  
Table 8 about here 
 
 
 
 
27 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper examined the antecedents of outside directors’ meeting attendance. In the context 
of Korean governance studies our study goes beyond extant studies that focus on the 
appointments of outside directors. Using three-level random coefficients models and using a 
unique dataset for Korea, where the corporate governance system has undergone substantial 
reform, the study shows that both outside directors’ personal characteristics and the social 
context are crucial in understanding board meeting attendance.  
Specifically, this study finds that foreign outside directors are less inclined to attend 
board meetings. As discussed earlier this behaviour could be attributed to a number of things 
including the geographical distance that exists between the firm headquarters and foreign 
countries and language barriers.  
The study also finds that outside directors who are appointed through the screening 
process are more likely to attend board meetings, suggesting the importance of a professional 
nomination and selection system of directors. 
Moreover, the study finds that re-appointed directors are more likely to attend board 
meetings. This suggests that firm-specific knowledge gained through past experience in an 
outside director’s own firm is important. An outside director who is reappointed is expected 
to have better knowledge of the firm because of learning by experience. This also suggests 
that re-appointed directors may want to repay the trust placed on them to continue serving the 
company by at least attending meetings. Indeed, as argued earlier, directors’ re-appointment 
to the board signifies the trust and level of satisfaction that shareholders have in the 
individuals. In addition, the study finds that busy directors are less likely to attend board 
meetings, an indication of their time commitment elsewhere. While a better measure of 
directors’ busyness would have been the number of board seats held by an individual 
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director, our approach of using professions deemed to be busy still give a good indicator of 
the subject at hand. The paper makes a number of contributions to corporate governance 
literature. To start with the issue of board attendance on its own is an important one. For 
instance, when a third or more of board seats are vacant or a few members are habitually 
absent, the board cannot be fully informed, cannot raise tough questions and cannot reach 
independent conclusions as a group. This paper, therefore, provides an awareness of the fact 
that characteristics of outside directors are salient in their behaviour and level of commitment 
in the context of board meetings attendance. Moreover, the study adds to the theory of 
corporate governance by examining the attendance of board meetings through the lens of 
organizational commitment. Such an approach lends to subsequent analysis of board 
performance as a function of directors’ attendance at meetings.  
Limitations and areas for further research 
Notwithstanding the relevance and timeliness of this study, we identify some limitations and 
suggest avenues for further research. First, while this study provides insight into the 
characteristics of board directors that allow or reduce the likelihood of attending board 
meetings, the unique circumstances of the context i.e. Korea, may allow limited 
generalizability of our findings. Perhaps, an extension of this study with firms from several 
countries could provide a better understanding of this subject.  
Second, we used selected professions to proxy for the busyness of the director. While 
we are confident that the results provide a good indication for the behaviour of a busy 
director, however, future studies could employ the number of board seats held by an 
individual director as a proxy for a busy director.  
Using the organizational commitment lens, future studies could examine the effect of 
board meeting attendance by various types of directors examined in this study (foreign, 
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independently screened directors, re-appointed directors and busy directors) on firm 
performance.    
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TABLE 1. 
FREQUENCY OF BOARD MEETING ATTENDANCE RATES BY OUTSIDE 
DIRECTORS 
  
 Point statistics Cumulative statistics 
Attendance rate 
(%) 
Frequency % Frequency % 
0 
25 
50 
75 
(86) 
100 
294 
38 
113 
100 
 
1,919 
5.66 
0.73 
2.17 
1.92 
 
36.93 
294 
857 
1,408 
2,093 
 
5,197 
5.66 
16.49 
27.09 
40.27 
(50.00) 
100.00 
 
This table reports point frequency (second and third columns) and cumulative frequency (last two columns) of 
outside directors’ board meeting attendance by different strata of attendance rates (first column). The cumulative 
statistics for attendance rate 0-25 include an attendance rate of 25 percent. The remainder of the cumulative 
statistics for attendance rates also include the upper figure but exclude the lower figure. Numbers in brackets 
denote median value.          
 
 
TABLE 2. 
ANNUAL ATTENDANCE RATE BY OUTSIDE DIRECTORS OVER 2002-2006 
 
year N mean sd P25 P50 P75 min max 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
1,191 
1,056 
1,118 
1,218 
614 
72.08 
68.69 
70.67 
72.14 
71.34 
33.45 
34.67 
33.61 
33.32 
33.77 
50 
40 
45.05 
50 
48 
87.50 
83 
85.71 
87 
86 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
Total 5,197 71.01 33.76 50 86 100 0 100 
 
sd and P respectively denotes standard deviation and percentiles.  
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TABLE 3. 
DISTRIBUTION OF OUTSIDE DIRECTORS’ JOB 
 
Type of Job Frequency Percent 
Accountant 213 4.10 
Lawyer 592 2.89 
Executive manager 1,711 32.93 
Professor 1,125 21.63 
Ex-government officer 271 5.22 
Others 1,285 33.23 
 
Others include (external) auditor, medical doctor, banker, journalist, researcher, tax officer.  
 
 
TABLE 4. 
DISTRIBUTION OF OUTSIDE DIRECTORS’ UNIVERSITY DEGREE 
 
Study major Frequency Percent 
Business 2,279 43.82 
Engineering 853 16.42 
Law 1,097 21.12 
Pharmacy 113 2.18 
Social Science 220 4.24 
Others 634 12.21 
 
Business includes economics, business administration (management), accounting and finance.  
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TABLE 5. 
ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR ATTENDANCE RATES BY THREE-LEVEL 
RANDOM COEFFICIENTS MODELS 
 
Variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 






.
.
coeff
Std  
Fixed part 
     
  
non-Korean  
 
-1.841*** -1.829*** -2.228*** -2.167*** -2.154***  [-37.7] 
  
(0.333) (0.332) (0.356) (0.365) (0.371)   
Committee  
 
0.301*** 0.278*** 0.236*** 0.219***  [5.8] 
   
(0.093) (0.094) (0.093) (0.093)   
non-KoreanXcomittee  
  
1.106** 0.998** 1.010  [10.6] 
    
(0.504) (0.504) (0.508)   
Reappointment  
   
0.137*** 0.132***  [6.3] 
     
(0.031) (0.031)   
lawyer_doctor  
     
-0.202**  [-4.0] 
      
(0.101)   
journalist 
    
-0.651**  [-4.0] 
     
(0.259) 
 Education  
     
-0.051  [-3.4] 
      
(0.045)   
Age  
     
0.004  [3.2] 
      
(0.004)   
Payment 
    
0.002*  [4.0] 
      
(0.001)   
Businessdegree  
    
0.163***  [5.9] 
      
(0.063)   
Lawdegree  
    
0.352***  [9.2] 
      
(0.080)   
Accountdegree  
     
0.406***  [4.8 ] 
      
(0.137) 
 _cons 3.662*** 3.716*** 3.681*** 3.684*** 3.620*** 3.621***   
 
(0.056) (0.055) (0.055) (0.056) (0.058) (0.118)   
Random 
part 
      
  
)1(2 L  0.562*** 0.544*** 0.544*** 0.544*** 0.519*** 0.516***   
 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123)   
)2(2
0
L  1.238*** 0.998*** 1.004*** 1.003*** 1.016*** 0.998***   
 
(0.064) (0.054) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.054)   
)2(2 L
Koreannon  
 
10.765*** 10.781*** 9.634*** 10.010*** 10.262***   
  
(1.727) (1.729) (1.587) (1.662) (1.714)   
)2(
_
)2(
0
L
vKoreannon
L


 
 
-3.278*** -3.290*** -3.187*** -3.189*** -3.201***   
  
(0.286) (0.287) (0.279) (0.787) (0.289)   
)3(2
0
L  1.171*** 1.226*** 1.179*** 1.181*** 1.134*** 1.131***   
 
(0.113) (0.109) (0.109) (0.109) (0.107) (0.106)   
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N 5197 5197 5197 5197 5197 5197   
Deviance 15668 15416 15406 15401 15173 15136   
aic 15677 15429 15421 15419 15196 15183   
 
Figures in brackets are standard errors. *, **, *** refers to significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively. 
 
 
TABLE 6. 
THREE-LEVEL ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR INTER-CLASS INTERACTIONS 
WITH CORPORATE GOVERNANCE VARIABLES 
 
 
 
Exceeding rate of 
outside directors 
Board’s equity 
ownership 
Free cash flow 
 
Variable Model_c1 Model_c2 Model_c3 Model_c4 Model_c5 Model_c6 
 
non-Korean -2.759*** -3.267*** -1.808*** -1.668*** -1.791*** -1.561*** 
 
(0.470) (0.502) (0.348) (0.340) (0.346) (0.361) 
exceedingrate 0.358* 0.278* 
    
 
(0.193) (0.194) 
    exceedingXnon-Korean 
 
3.872*** 
    
  
(1.343) 
    boardownership 
  
-0.210** -0.046 
  
   
(0.100) (0.105) 
  boardownXnon-Korean 
   
-1.706*** 
  
    
(0.336) 
  FCF 
    
-0.214 -0.110 
     
(0.295) (0.298) 
FCFXnon-Korean 
     
-4.553*** 
      
(1.918) 
reappointment 0.185*** 0.187*** 0.147*** 0.148*** 0.152*** 0.152*** 
 
(0.039) (0.039) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) 
lawyer_doctor -0.178 -0.180 -0.202** -0.205** -0.210** -0.211** 
 
(0.138) (0.137) (0.101) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) 
journalist -0.745** -0.740** -0.744*** -0.742*** -0.703*** -0.703*** 
 
(0.342) (0.342) (0.272) (0.272) (0.264) (0.264) 
education -0.052 -0.051 -0.046 -0.045 -0.064 -0.064 
 
(0.057) (0.057) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
age 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
payment 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
businessdegree 0.347*** 0.346*** 0.213*** 0.213*** 0.172*** 0.173*** 
 
(0.084) (0.084) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) 
lawdegree 0.404*** 0.403*** 0.377*** 0.378*** 0.360*** 0.361*** 
 
(0.106) (0.106) (0.081) (0.080) (0.081) (0.080) 
accountingdegree 0.390*** 0.389*** 0.400*** 0.399*** 0.410*** 0.410*** 
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(0.175) (0.175) (0.142) (0.142) (0.138) (0.138) 
_cons 3.419*** 3.423*** 3.618*** 3.593*** 3.664*** 3.658*** 
 
(0.146) (0.146) (0.122) (0.122) (0.123) (0.122) 
N 3852 3852 4923 4923 5032 5032 
Deviance 11894 11886 14304 14278 14619 14612 
aic 11928 11922 14339 14316 14651 14649 
 
This table reports estimates from three-level random coefficients models by the MLE method: 
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kkjkkjkijk vKoreannonvvOthersCGKoreannonCGKoreannonRateAttendance  
 Figures in brackets are standard errors. *, **, *** refers to significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively. 
Random parts are not reported for brevity purpose.  
TABLE 7. 
RESULTS OF ESTIMATION EXCLUDING 2003 OR 2004 FOR THE PREFERRED 
FULL MODEL AND FIRMS THAT APPOINTED MORE OUTSIDE DIRECTORS 
THAN THE LEGAL REQUIREMENT 
 
 
 
Excluding 2003 Excluding 2004 
 
Preferred full 
model 
Firm with 
exceeding rate 
for outsiders 
Preferred full 
model 
Firm with 
exceeding rate 
for outsiders 
non-Korean -2.193*** -3.343*** -2.330*** -3.155*** 
 
(0.380) (0.501) (0.413) (0.545) 
committee 0.332*** 
 
0.228*** 
 
 
(0.122) 
 
(0.091) 
 non-KoreanXcommittee 1.207** 
 
1.119** 
 
 
(0.532) 
 
(0.554) 
 exceedingrate 
 
0.204* 
 
0.150* 
  
(0.177) 
 
(0.103) 
non-KoreanXexceedingrate 
 
4.878*** 
 
2.384* 
  
(1.158) 
 
(1.257) 
reappointment 0.070** 0.095** 0.174*** 0.257*** 
 
(0.031) (0.039) (0.038) (0.046) 
lawyer_doctor -0.284** -0.207** -0.261** -0.245** 
 
(0.108) (0.141) (0.103) (0.138) 
journalist -0.485** -0.463 -0.578** -0.582* 
 
(0.271) (0.336) (0.265) (0.340) 
education -0.006 -0.015 -0.050 -0.057 
 
(0.048) (0.060) (0.047) (0.060) 
age 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 
 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
payment 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
businessdegree 0.150*** 0.348*** 0.171*** 0.397*** 
 
(0.069) (0.092) (0.065) (0.087) 
lawdegree 0.367*** 0.324*** 0.399*** 0.467*** 
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(0.088) (0.112) (0.084) (0.109) 
accountingdegree 0.420*** 0.431*** 0.413*** 0.375*** 
 
(0.148) (0.196) (0.142) (0.179) 
_cons 3.574*** 3.456*** 3.574*** 3.368*** 
 
(0.125) 
 
(0.151) 
 
(0.124) 
 
(0.152) 
 
N 4133 3069 4070 3024 
Deviance 11334 8862 11509 8974 
aic 11370 8897 11544 9009 
 
This table reports the results of MLE estimation of three-level random coefficients models excluding the year 
2003 or 2004 for the preferred full model and firms that appointed more outside directors than the legal 
requirement (i.e., the 25 percent rule or the 50 percent rule). Figures in brackets are standard errors. *, **, *** 
refers to significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively. Random parts are not reported for brevity 
purpose.  
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TABLE 8. 
ESTIMATION RESULTS OF TWO-WAY RANDOM COMPONENT MODELS AND 
TWO-LEVEL RANDOM COEFFICIENT MODELS 
 
 
Non-hierarchical models 
 
 
Two-level models 
 
Variable 
Firm+ 
year effect+ 
committee 
(1) 
Firm+ 
year 
effect+ 
exceedingrate 
(2) 
 
Firm effect+ 
committee 
(3) 
Firm effect+ 
exceedingrate 
(4) 
 
Full model with 
committee 
(5) 
Full model with 
exceedingrate 
(6) 
        non-Korean -3.204*** -3.851*** -3.202*** -3.849*** 
 
-2.075*** -2.608*** 
 
(0.148) (0.258) (0.148) (0.258) 
 
(0.382) (0.580) 
committee 0.144* 
 
0.151* 
  
0.414*** 
 
 
(0.101) 
 
(0.101) 
  
(0.066) 
 non-KoreanX 
commitee 2.354*** 
 
2.354*** 
  
1.213*** 
 
 
(0.230) 
 
(0.230) 
  
(0.420) 
 exceedingrate 
 
0.624** 
 
0.599** 
  
1.847*** 
  
(0.278) 
 
(0.275) 
  
(0.244) 
non-Korean 
exceedingrate 
 
2.986** 
 
2.985** 
  
2.484* 
  
(1.424) 
 
(1.425) 
  
(1.489) 
reappointment 0.194*** 0.254*** 0.190*** 0.254*** 
 
0.199*** 0.304*** 
 
(0.039) (0.051) (0.039) (0.050) 
 
(0.055) (0.058) 
lawyer_doctor -0.143** -0.307** -0.143** -0.307** 
 
-0.162* -0.238** 
 
(0.071) (0.106) (0.071) (0.106) 
 
(0.097) (0.111) 
journalist -0.773*** -0.955*** -0.776*** -0.955*** 
 
-0.677*** -0.708*** 
 
(0.181) (0.243) (0.181) (0.243) 
 
(0.228) (0.270) 
education -0.112** -0.146*** -0.110*** -0.147*** 
 
-0.084** -0.158*** 
 
(0.035) (0.044) (0.035) (0.044) 
 
(0.040) (0.043) 
age 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 
 
0.001 0.006 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
 
(0.004) (0.004) 
payment 0.003** 0.003* 0.003** 0.003* 
 
0.008*** 0.008*** 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
businessdegree 0.062* 0.128** 0.061* 0.126** 
 
0.267*** 0.293*** 
 
(0.048) (0.062) (0.048) (0.062) 
 
(0.059) (0.064) 
lawdegree 0.174** 0.332** 0.174** 0.330** 
 
0.330*** 0.410*** 
 
(0.066) (0.088) (0.066) (0.088) 
 
(0.083) (0.092) 
accountdegree 0.426*** 0.479*** 0.426*** 0.475*** 
 
0.157*** 0.173*** 
 
(0.104) (0.130) (0.104) (0.130) 
 
(0.127) (0.132) 
_cons 3.815*** 3.720*** 3.815*** 3.726*** 
 
3.650*** 3.563*** 
 
(0.101) (0.124) (0.100) (0.122) 
 
(0.102) (0.116) 
        
N 5180 3852 5180 3852 
 
4070 3852 
Deviance 17203 13548 17203 13550 
 
15111 14849 
aic 17235 13580 17233 13580 
 
15145 14883 
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This table reports the MLE estimations of non-hierarchical two-way error-component models (Columns 1-4): 
ittjjt vvRateAttendance  ][ 21βx' , where j and t respectively denotes the firm and year; and two-level random 
coefficients models (Columns 5-6): )1()2(
1
)2(
0
L
ij
L
j
L
jij KoreannonvvRateAttendance  βx'  . Models (1), (3), and (5) 
are for the preferred full model (Model 6 in TABLE V.), which includes committee and its interaction with non-
Korean, and Models (2), (4), and (6) are this full model replacing this committee variable with exceedingrate. 
The exceedingrate variable denotes the voluntary portion of the ratio of outside directors to board members. 
Figures in brackets are standard errors. *, **, *** refers to significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively. 
Random parts are not reported for brevity purpose.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
GRAPH 1. 
REGRESSION LINE FOR ATTENDANCE RATE OF FOREIGN AND KOREAN 
OUTSIDE DIRECTORS, PREDICTED BY INDEPENDENT APPOINTMENT 
PROCESS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This graph reports the heterogeneous intermediate effect of an independent selection process for outside 
directors on the natural logarithm of attendance rate of Korean outside directors (non-Korean=0) in comparison 
with foreign outside directors (non-Korean=1). It depicts the regression line for the attendance rate of foreign 
outside directors, predicted by independent selection (i.e., committee=1) or lack of independent selection (i.e., 
committee=0). The prediction is based on 
.106.1278.0228.2684.3)ln( committeeKoreannoncommitteeKoreannonRateAttendance 
. 
The two numbers on the left hand side (LHS) indicate average log attendance rate of foreign outside directors in 
a firm that appoints outside directors without committee screening (committee=0). The remaining two numbers 
on the RHS indicate the expected log attendance rate of Korean and foreign outside directors when a firm 
appoints outside directors through a committee screening process.  
 
 
 
ln (Attendance rate )   
 Korean outside director (non-Korean=0)    3.963 
           3.684 
         2.798 
 Foreign outside director (non-Korean=1) 
 
          1.405 
 
 
                     Committee=0                 Committee=1    Independent selection process 
                                        
